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One of the principal claims to legitimacy of the post-1949 Communist Party
of China (CPC) regime was its elimination of the ubiquitous bandit gangs that
had come to characterize the country, particularly since the breakdown of
central authority following the revolution of 1911. With the conclusion of the
nationwide suppression (剿匪) campaigns in 195253 － the date varied
according to province and region － bandits (土匪) became the epitome of
evil, one of the many symbols of the “bad old days” that were constantly
hauled out to justify the CPC’s ruthless grip on power.1)
Buffeted by incessant political campaigns during the 1950s and early 1960s,
most Chinese people did not have a lot of time to spare for the subject of old
China’s bandits. To ensure that they did not forget entirely, cultural products
such as the popular 1958 propaganda movie ‘Heroes with the Hearts of Tigers’
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(英雄虎胆), the story of a heroic People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
detachment that successfully pursued and killed a particularly rapacious gang
which had been terrorizing the residents of one Guangxi mountain region,
were churned out to remind them.2) In the mid-1960s, with the outbreak of the
“Cultural Revolution”, the Party’s legacy of bandit suppression received a new
lease on life. One of Jiang Qing (江青)’s so-called “revolutionary operas”,
‘Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy’ (智取威虎山),3) sought to use the pre-
1949 anti-bandit campaigns to reinforce the regime’s political legitimacy.
Based on Qu Bo (曲波)’s widely-acclaimed 1957 novel Lin hai xue yuan (林
海雪原),4) it told the romanticized story of a CPC activist in Northeast China
in the 1940s who put his life on the line by going single-handedly into a bandit
lair and killing the gang’s leader.
For most Chinese people who had reached maturity in the 1960s, Jiang
Qing’s opera was their first encounter with bandits, and at the same time a
formative experience that clearly demarked bandits as villains in stark contrast
to the purity of the revolutionary hero. By depicting the bandits as
stereotyped “baddies” and denying them a voice of their own with which to
defend their actions (a hallmark of reports on bandit activity under any
political regime), both the opera and the novel it was derived from had the
effect of making the CPC activists sent to eliminate the bandits appear all the
more heroic. Many young people educated after 1949, in the thralls of post-
revolutionary “victors’ justice”, evidently learned by heart the words of the
aria sung by the hero as he plunged into the bandits’ lair : “Friends ! We are
soldiers of the worker-peasant army who have come into the depths of these
mountains in order to exterminate the reactionary forces and create a brand-
new world !” Bandits, that is, for young Chinese of the post-1960 generation,
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were not individuals but the anonymous targets of military suppression
campaigns, foils for the revolutionary heroism of communist activists. If many
an impressionable young Chinese shed a tear when they heard these words, it
was for the bravery of these activists, not for the fate of their bandit
adversaries.
A similar though less dramatic effect was achieved by the numerous
volumes of reportage describing the post-1949 bandit suppression campaigns
in different parts of China that began to appear after the mid-1990s.5) Despite
the appearance of a swift-moving revolutionary campaign culminating in the
victory of 1949, in fact more than three years passed before the CPC achieved
unchallenged control over China. One of the principal threats to its hegemony
was the continuing nuisance posed by bandits who, despite the regime’s claims
to have eliminated them, remained a potent force in many parts of southern
and southwestern China thanks largely to instigation by old-regime diehards
left behind following the Nationalist government’s removal to Taiwan. “Bandit
suppression” thus became a major concern of the new regime, but, apart from
a few serious incidents that made the national headlines, the truth about these
campaigns was swept under the carpet for more than forty years until, for
reasons of its own, the post-Tiananmen regime decided to make certain details
of the campaigns public. In essence, however, the reportage that resulted from
the Party’s decision was cast in the same vein as the heroic movies and
revolutionary operas referred to above, describing an epic struggle between
the forces of good (the Party) and evil (bandits) in which the fate of China
itself lay in the balance.
Usually drawing on authentic contemporary PLA and local government
documents, and often painstakingly detailed about the number of gangs
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suppressed and the effort required to suppress them, the post-1990
suppression reports gave no voice to the “bandits” who were the target of the
campaigns.6) While we learn much about the regime’s own anxieties, and about
the considerable difficulties required before the campaigns could be carried to
a successful conclusion, understanding of the “bandits” themselves is not
something that can be gleaned from these materials. The omission is not
surprising, since their primary objective was to paint an uncomplicated black
and white picture of the suppression campaigns’ legitimacy. Anything
suggesting that the people being so ruthlessly suppressed might have had a
different viewpoint on what was happening would have made matters
impossibly complicated. (For military commanders on the ground, the issue
was naturally not a top priority anyway.)
Meanwhile, as the post-Tiananmen CPC and PLA struggled to reaffirm their
revolutionary credentials, the history of pre-1949 bandit suppression was again
called upon lest people forget the fact that the PLA had once been a band of
heroes dedicated to creating a new China instead of merely a military force
with the ability to crush those who opposed the regime’s interests. ‘Chronicle
of Bandit Suppression in West Hunan’ (湘西剿匪記) was a two-part film first
shown in 1987 that became known as a classic of 1980s Chinese cinema. It
told the story of yet another heroic band of PLA soldiers who succeeded,
against all odds and despite great sacrifices, in suppressing the notorious
bandits of West Hunan, an impregnable bandit lair since at least the Song
period. Here too the emphasis was on the self-sacrificing bravery of the
suppression force, with the bandits depicted as stereotyped villains. Though
bandit-related books (many of them piratical) enjoyed a brief publishing vogue
in the 1990s,7) it needs to be pointed out that Chinese people’s image of
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bandits had been forged on the anvil of “bandit suppression”. Bandits had
become the epitome of counter-revolutionary iniquity : like crime audiences
anywhere, Chinese readers were simultaneously thrilled by the audaciousness
and rapacity of the bandits they read about but relieved by the inevitable
victory of the forces of law and order.
As publishing conditions in China improved around the turn of the 21st
century, a new wave of post-1949 suppression campaign histories appeared,
beginning with a multi-volume documentary collection entitled ‘The Bandit
Suppression Struggle’ (剿匪闘争) .8) More recently, the meticulously
researched and elegantly produced 6-volume set ‘Compendium of Bandit-
Suppression Records from New China’ (新中国剿匪叢書) has also
appeared from the same publisher.9) As well as the usual military accounts,
these new materials include personal memoirs from soldiers and other people
involved in the campaigns, and the editors have managed to ferret out large
quantities of detail from previously inaccessible journals in newly-opened
archives throughout China. Paper quality and general presentation have also
improved, adding to their persuasive power. Yet, for all the attention to local
detail and stress on locating the campaigns within the contemporary political
situation,10) even these new accounts continued to share a similar failing with
their predecessors, that of having been researched, documented and written
from the standpoint of the suppressor, not from that of the people being
suppressed. As such they are ultimately unsatisfactory as social history, even
if they add to our understanding of the socio-political crisis that faced China in
the early years following the CPC’s conquest of power.
The easiest way to make history is to write it yourself, and this axiom was
certainly true of the campaigns to eliminate China’s vast population of
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bandits. In the jargon of the day, “bandits” was a generic term encompassing
a multitude of armed groups. First there were the traditional-style bandits,
desperate people who, lacking the means of making a regular livelihood, had
taken the traditional route of holing up in the mountains and relying on extra-
legal, generally violent methods to survive. In 194950, following the transfer
of state power, the term also potentially encompassed every grouping, armed
or otherwise, beyond the control of the CPC: former regular army units of
both the Nationalist government and local warlord cliques, secret society
forces, even vocational groups such as transport workers’ guilds that had
developed their own exclusive (and sometimes armed) organizations.11) While
some of the traditional type of bandits may have forged alliances of
convenience with the regular troops of the old regime that had taken refuge in
the same mountains, many more so-called “bandits” were former peasants or
hired hands merely seeking to survive amid increasingly perilous socio-
political conditions. Whether they were anti-government organizations, armed
self-defence groups, or simply predatory gangs, all of these forces were
subsumed under the label “bandit”, which was also a convenient way of
obscuring any political or social objectives that they might have had.
In this way, when accounts of the post-1949 suppression campaigns mention
“bandits” they conveniently fail to make clear the true nature of the people
they are referring to ; all are assumed to have been, either consciously or
unconsciously, “counter-revolutionary forces”.12) Recently released materials,
however, make clear that many of those labelled “bandits” were in fact farmers
who were seeking to resist the new government’s onerous grain tax
policy.13) All in all, the image of a China coming smoothly under the communist
government’s control was a myth. The southwestern provinces, where the
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communists had no experience of governing, came under Beijing’s control
much sooner than they had anticipated due to the crumbling of the Nationalist
government’s resistance, and presented the new regime with problems that
proved difficult to solve through military methods alone. For a time, Brown
has suggested, resistance all across southwest China to the extension of
communist control was “shockingly successful” ,14) and the much-vaunted
“liberation of the southwest” could more accurately be called a “campaign of
terror”.
Against this background, contrary to all reasonable expectations, a highly
unusual book has appeared in China that throws a very different light on one
of the post-1949 bandit suppression campaigns. Huang Jishu’s ‘Defeated
Soldiers Become Bandits : a History of the 19491952 Suppression Campaign’
(敗兵成匪 : 1949到1952年的剿匪往事)15) is based largely on interviews
conducted with former “bandits” or their surviving family members from the
1960s to the 1990s. Instead of simply expounding at length on the military
aspects of the campaigns, the book seeks equally to tell the story through the
eyes of the campaigns’ targets. In stark red letters against a black background,
the cover blurb informs us that “Only now, after more than 60 years, can the
story of this bandit suppression campaign be revealed”. For once the claim is
rather more than just publisher’s hyperbole.
Huang Jishu’s book deals with the bandit suppression campaign in one
province, the southwestern province of Guangxi, in the years immediately
following “Liberation” in 1949. After more than ten years of all-out war and
twenty years of national fragmentation prior to that, by 1949 there was hardly
a province in China that did not have a bandit problem. Pacification, as noted
above, became a top priority for the central government in Beijing, and has
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been characterized as a continuation of the struggle against the Guomindang
government’s regular army,16) even as a “second Liberation War”.17) In few
places was the residual bandit problem more pressing than in Guangxi, for
reasons that were both domestic and international.
Until the 1990s, the only information available on the campaigns in Guangxi,
apart from a number of fragmentary memoirs scattered in various archives
throughout the province, had been the posthumously published memoirs of the
former PLA General Li Tianyou (李天佑), titled ‘Springtime Comes to
Yaoshan : a Memoir of the Bandit Suppression Struggle in Guangxi’ (瑶山的
春天 広西剿匪闘争回憶録).18) Li had personally commanded one wing of the
suppression campaign that focused on the national minority area of Yaoshan
and was thus familiar with the local situation. Moved by the sacrifices made by
his troops and by local people participating in the campaign, Li Tianyou wrote
in the Afterword to his book, he resolved to set down his memoirs to preserve
their memory .19) While unusual in having been written by a top PLA
commander, Li’s brief memoir, like the volumes referred to above, stresses
the valiant efforts of the people conducting the suppression campaign, and pays
no heed to the motives and circumstances of those against whom the campaign
was directed. (A creature of its time, it also suffers from its tendency to pay
excessive obeisance to Chairman Mao.)
From the 1990s onwards, a number of books on the Guangxi suppression
campaigns began to appear, some of them straightforward histories, others
documentary collections. Representative among these were the 1991 volume
‘Bandit Suppression in Guangxi’ (广西剿匪) and the 2008 ‘History of Bandit
Suppression in Guangxi’ (广西剿匪史).20) While they are valuable in their own
way for having filled in a number of gaps in our knowledge of the post-1949
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events in Guangxi, these official publications continued in the tradition of
writing history from the viewpoint of the victors. The voices of those on the
other side of the divide, those labelled as “bandits”, can be heard but faintly if
at all. Significautly, they seem not to have been considered important by
either of the two volumes’ editors.
Pre-1949 Guangxi’s situation was unique for a number of reasons. For
twenty years or so prior to 1949 it had been to all intents and purposes the
private fiefdom of the so-called “New Guangxi Clique” (新桂系) headed by
two local militarists named Bai Chongxi (白崇禧) and Li Zongren (李宗仁).
While nominally allied to the central government of Jiang Jieshi, these two had
not only established their own independent military command but had also set
up a formidable province-wide militia network based on the principle known as
the “three selfs”: self-defence, self-government, and self-sufficiency. Control
of these militias, however, was in the hands of local landlords and rich
powerholders, naturally not inclined to welcome the advent of a new
government that was bent (ostensibly, at least) on leveling social classes. The
militia thus became natural recruits for the anti-communist resistance and
another source of candidates for the generic label “bandit”.
In October 1949, the Guangxi Clique’s regular army divisions received a
drubbing at the hands of crack field units of the PLA led by Lin Biao and
retreated wholesale inside the provincial boundaries, where they were joined
by more defeated troops of the central government. While Li and Bai fled to
the USA and Taiwan, respectively, the province they left behind them was
transformed into a hornets’ nest. The combination of unpaid, leaderless troops
and a well-armed local militia commanded by landlords loyal to the province’s
former rulers was a deadly combination, adding to and diversifying the vast
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number of bandits for which Guangxi was already famous (several hundred
thousand were said to be hiding out in the province even after the
establishment of the CPC regime). Incited by clandestine Nationalist
operatives ordered to lay the ground for the impending return of the old
regime, for the following three years these desperate men helped to make
Guangxi a thorn in the side of the fledgling regime in Beijing.21) They were
aided by Guangxi’s natural karst scenery, where a local saying had it that
“there is no place without a mountain, no mountain without a cave, and no
cave without its bandit gang”.22) These “political bandits” (政治土匪), it
should be said, were bandits only because the communists labeled them so for
their audacity in not downing arms when ordered, but the label proved
convenient as a way of denying the existence of significant local opposition to
the CPC’s assumption of control.
The effective pacification of this restive province was vital to the new
regime’s stability. In the space of six months from late 1950 to May 1951, Mao
Zedong himself, busy as he was with, among other things, the prosecution of
the “War to Aid Korea and Resist America”,23) had time to send numerous
angry telegrams ordering the PLA’s Guangxi commanders to get on with their
job. The most famous among them was undoubtedly the November 14 1950
message in which Mao admonished them: “The achievements of the Guangxi
suppression campaign lag far behind those of all the other provinces. The
reason is that the suppression methods employed by the commanders there
suffer from serious failings.” First Secretary of the South China Military
Section (華南分局) Ye Jianying (叶劍英) and Chairman of the Central-South
Military Region’s (中南軍区) Political Department Tao Zhu (陶鋳) were
immediately transferred to Guangxi with orders to oversee the campaign
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there. They were warned not to return until the bandits’ elimination was
complete.24)
Mao’s anxiety was understandable given China’s political situation at the
time. For at least two years after the achievement of “national victory” in
1949, attacks by Guomindang-sponsored operatives on transport arteries, air
raids (even on major cities like Shanghai), and assassinations of local CPC
officials (sometimes in a horrendous manner) had continued throughout the
country. Hardly ever reported in the mainstream media, these attacks gave
the new government ample cause for worry.25) An even greater concern was
Jiang Jieshi’s continuing threat, from his bastion on Taiwan, to take back the
mainland by force. If it ever materialized, the threat would almost certainly be
launched primarily via landings along the Guangdong coast, and the Guangxi
bandit gangs holed up across the provincial border could be relied upon to rise
up in response.26) (Many of them were in fact Nationalist government guerillas
and political activists who had been planted there for precisely that purpose
before the government decamped for Taiwan.) In order for an attempted
Guomindang landing in Guangdong to be repelled successfully, Mao was
convinced that it was necessary both to successfully carry out land reform in
Guangdong so as to prevent disgruntled local peasants from supporting the
invading armies, and to eliminate the military threat posed by the “political
bandits” of Guangxi.
The outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950 and China’s
intervention the following October increased tensions even further, and was
undoubtedly one factor affecting Mao’s growing nervousness. Indeed, the
regime began to draw a clear connection between bandit suppression in China
and resisting America in Korea. A local Guizhou newspaper quoted by Jeremy
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Brown pointed out : “Our provincial victory over bandits is inseparable from
China’s peace enterprise and opposing the American invasion. Bandit
suppression has greatly strengthened our interior, rooted out the claws and
teeth of the American invaders, overthrown the evil reactionary regime, and
expanded and strengthened our national power. . . in the course of the Resist
America Aid Korea Protect Home and Country Campaign, bandit suppression
is still an important practical action.”27)
The effect of Mao’s frankly expressed anxiety and veiled threats of
retribution was to bring the upper and lower echelons of Guangxi’s
suppression command together. By the end of 1952, after a campaign lasting
more than three years － roughly equivalent to the length of the post-war
liberation struggle itself － and the extermination of more than 500,000 (the
official figure was 512,91728)) “bandits”－ roughly equivalent to the number of
Guomindang troops eliminated in the course of the 1948 Huaihai Campaign
(淮海戰役) － “bandit suppression” in Guangxi ― what should really be
called the subjection of an entire province to legal terror― was finally brought
to a victorious conclusion.
At first sight, Huang Jishu’s book, lacking either source references or a
bibliography, appears little different from its predecessors. While casual
readers might not be bothered by such omissions, specialist historians
justifiably feel suspicious. Reading through the text, however, one realizes the
reason for this characteristic, for the book owes little to written sources and
everything to a combination of strenuous legwork and patient fact-finding
spread over a period of some 40 years. A Guangxi resident and former PLA
soldier himself, Huang Jishu’s original intention, he told the authors in an
email, had been to write no more than the usual documented story of how the
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PLA had valiantly resolved Guangxi’s “bandit calamity”. However, the
numerous official suppression histories that appeared after the 1990s
convinced him that such stories were no more than “history from above”,
second-hand accounts telling only half of the story that needed to be told －
the official perspective － while ignoring the remaining half － the feelings of
the people caught up in what must surely have been a nightmare : not only for
the “bandits” themselves but also for the people they lived among. He
thereupon resolved to take a new perspective on the history of the Guangxi
suppression campaigns, and to write the kind of book that could not have been
written from an official standpoint. Rather than relying on written accounts, he
would actually go out to meet the people that everyone else had ignored, for
it was only in the hearts of these people that the true facts of social history
could be discerned.29) In a word, he vowed to “listen to what the bandits had
to say”.
It was easier said than done. While a number of Li Zongren’s officers －
“bandit chiefs” in the parlance of the time － had surrendered to the
communists in the final weeks of 1949 and been successfully pacified, others
had either escaped to Hong Kong or Taiwan or else had disappeared without
trace. Some of the former were fortunately still living at the time of Huang
Jishu’s fact-finding tours, including Feng Huang () and Wei Ruilin (
瑞林) (see below), and he was able to interview them for his book. Valuable
witnesses as these people were, however, they were not participants in the
fresh outburst of resistance that had erupted in 1950 and therefore could
provide only limited information. On the other hand, most of those who had
taken part in that eruption had either been killed in the struggle or executed
following their surrender. (Many more had been ruthlessly eliminated by local
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communist authorities despite guarantees of pardon, as we shall see － one
reason why this story has remained under wraps for so long.)30) For Huang
Jishu, this was just one of the obstacles he confronted in his attempt to write
the true story of post-1949 Guangxi :
I thus was unable to meet up with and interview any of the great “bandit
chiefs” that I write about in my book － they had all been killed ! And yet
I had to write about them: where they came from, their life histories, how
they became bandits, what their gangs were like and how they behaved, how
they were eliminated, and so on. My only hope was to seek information
indirectly from people who had known them, for the scattered written
information available was generally in the form of either official PLA
suppression reports or lists of those chiefs’ “great crimes” that were
preserved in the Zhengxie (政協)’s historical archives31) . While such
materials might offer a few meagre hints as to what really happened, that
was it.
The “bandit chiefs” themselves had all been eliminated, but to kill all the
people who had known them was an impossible task. The focus of my fact-
finding interviews thus became how to locate those people and effectively
acquire the information I wanted. First of all I had to put myself on an equal
standing with them, which meant, of course, that I could not ask local
officials to accompany me. To do so would have certainly caused people to
fear that they were once again about to be persecuted for crimes committed
in the distant past (“historical problems”, they would have been called).
Naturally they would not have dared to tell me anything ! Most of these
people, for no more than the crime of having once been acquainted with
someone once condemned as a “bandit chief”, had already been subject to
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numerous political and economic constraints since “Liberation” and had
suffered many hardships. When I went to interview them, therefore, I made
a point of taking with me small gifts like biscuits and instant noodles . . .32)
Huang’s book is without doubt the most vividly written treatment of the
post-1949 suppression campaigns to have appeared to date. Expecting no
more than the usual descriptions of military campaigns and revolutionary self-
sacrifice, readers are likely to find themselves unable to put the book down, so
unusual is it in its focus on the victims rather the victors. Although it deals
primarily with the so-called “political bandits” who possessed ties of various
degrees of strength to the previous regime, the book offers profound insight
into the Guangxi “bandits”’ daily lives. More than any other account of the
post-1949 suppression campaigns, its 300+ pages of text not only reveal much
about the way PLA troops operated, but also enable us to encounter the
“bandits” as people and to gain a grandstand view of how they, their families
and their fellow-villagers experienced the PLA’s onslaught.
There is a basic pattern to the stories we find in the standard accounts of the
post-1949 suppression campaigns, as if the same story had been “cloned” and
regurgitated in volume after volume. On a moonless night when the wind is
high, the Guomindang-affiliated “bandits”, knowing no limits to their evil,
venture out to kill and burn, causing their impotent victims to bristle with
anger. Into the breach rides the valiant PLA detachment, its victory
guaranteed but only at the climax of a bitter struggle, after which it returns to
base enabling the thankful villagers to live in peace once more. In Huang
Jishu’s telling, however, the last days of the Guangxi “bandits” come across as
a rather more complex story. By way of illustration, let us take two examples
from his book.
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The first story is that of Chen Shanwen (陳善文), an officer in the
splendidly-titled “Guangxi People’s Anti-Communist National Salvation Force”
(広西人民反共救国軍), whose capture by government troops led to a
surprising rebirth. Though he was no more than a “bandit” from the point of
view of the suppression forces, Chen’s life story entailed much more than that
label suggests.
Before joining the anti-communist resistance, Chen Shanwen had been a
doctor known far and wide for his healing powers, in particular for a cure for
bone injuries passed down through generations of his family which he had used
to treat countless numbers of local people. After his home town of Yulin (玉
林) fell to the PLA forces, Chen Shanwen felt instinctively that the life he had
known was gone, never to return. When an old friend urged him to throw in
his lot with the resistance, Chen made up his mind. Carrying no more than a
small bag crammed with medicinal cures and a few personal possessions, he
set off on what he knew could only be a one-way trip to the life of a “bandit”,
eventually rising to the rank of major-general and deputy commander in the
Guangxi People’s Anti-Communist National Salvation Force. His fellow-
“bandits”― more than 200 villages in Yulin County alone had rebelled against
the communists― regarded Chen respectfully as the “Hua Tuo [華佗] of the
National Salvation Force”,33) saying that “as long as they had their Hua Tuo,
they had nothing to fear from the communists’ bomber planes”. On the basis
of his healing skills Chen Shanwen also became head of the Salvation Force’s
medical corps, but when disaster struck he had no way to protect the other
men from the aerial bombs of the forces come to eliminate them, and he was
captured along with those of his comrades who had not been killed in the
PLA’s advance.
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When news came of Chen Shanwen’s capture, official documents tell us, the
cadres and “masses” of Yulin howled for revenge, insisting that “blood should
be repaid with blood”. Since Chen had been a highly respected doctor in his
local community, these claims should be taken with a pinch of salt, yet Chen
himself was resigned to his imminent execution as an accused former “bandit
chief”. Then, just as the Yulin public security office was deliberating his fate,
an order came from Tao Zhu, Chairman of the South-Central Military District’s
Political Office, transmitting a memorandum from the Communist Party’s
Central Committee : “Concerning those criminals who possess certain
particular skills, provided that they are ready to confess their wrongdoings,
you may offer them the chance to redeem themselves through meritorious
deeds.” Thanks to this fortuitous bolt from the blue, Chen Shanwen’s sentence
was a mere seven years’ imprisonment.
When he received the news of his lenient sentence, Chen Shanwen was so
overcome with emotion that he fell to his knees, his face covered in tears.
After commencing his imprisonment he revealed to his captors the means to
produce some of his family’s in-house medical prescriptions for curing bruised
and broken bones. Many of them went into mass production, first being sent
to the battlefields of Korea for the treatment of wounded Chinese volunteer
soldiers there, later, as traditional Chinese medicine, being exported all over
the world. Chen Shanwen was also called upon to treat the illnesses of top
communist leaders like Dong Biwu (董必武), Nie Rongzhen (聶榮臻), Luo
Ronghuan (羅榮桓) and He Long (賀龍). Following his early release in 1956,
Chen opened a small clinic in his hometown of Yulin and continued to win
renown for his medical skills. He was later elected a special representative to
the Guangxi Zhengxie. Although replaced by other remedies and no longer
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produced in China, medicines derived from his family’s traditional
prescriptions were for a long time used all over the world under the “Yulin”
brand name, though few if any of the people who used it were aware that this
medicine had been brought into the world by a one-time “bandit” officer of
China’s anti-communist resistance !34)
“Those who ought to have died survived, while those whose life had been
vouched for died.” This refrain is reflected in the second story which, though
very different from that of Chen Shanwen, is equally instructive. Zhong Zupei
(鐘祖培) was a classmate of Li Zongren who had studied alongside the future
provincial leader from elementary school right up to their graduation from
middle school. After graduation the two men’s association continued, as Zhong
rose to become a lieutenant-general and deputy corps commander in Li’s
Seventh Army Corps. When his patron was transferred out of the province in
1937 following the July 7 Incident and the outbreak of war with Japan, Zhong
Zupei, left high and dry, was forced to return to his hometown of Gongcheng
(恭城) where he lived the life of a country recluse. At the same time, he took
on the posts of local militia commander and delegate to the National Assembly
(国民大会), becoming the image of the country gentleman and gaining a local
reputation as an upright official who could be relied upon to deal with affairs
fairly and firmly.
Following Gongcheng’s “Liberation” in December 1949, the newly-
established People’s Government followed the usual pattern of calling for all
privately-held guns and ammunition to be handed in. Zhong Zupei’s arsenal by
this time included several hundred rifles as well as thousands of rounds of
ammunition, making him something of a “greenwoods chieftain” (草頭王) and
inclined to put up a fight. On January 25, 1950 Zhong Zupei rebelled at the
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head of more than 4000 men, forming the “Gongcheng People’s Anti-
Communist National Salvation Army” (恭城人民反共救国軍) and helping to
set off a fresh round of province-wide resistance. Over a period of no more
than a couple of days, in what became known as the province-shaking
“Gongcheng Revolt” (恭城暴動), Zhong’s forces, supplemented by dozens of
bandit gangs from surrounding counties ,35) smashed the county’s newly-
installed local government and set up their own independent regime.
Retribution was not long in coming : under the relentless onslaught of PLA
units the “National Salvation Army” was forced onto the back foot. In the end,
however, a major factor in persuading Zhong Zupei to give in to the besieging
suppression force was the latter’s recruitment of his daughter to call out
across Gongcheng’s city walls for him to abandon his “futile” rebellion.
Finally, having received a guarantee from the local Party Committee’s
security chief that his life would be spared, Zhong Zupei hoisted the white flag
and opened the city’s gates. In reward for his cooperative attitude, he was
given the post of chairman of Gongcheng’s Pacification Committee (恭城招
撫委員会) and played a large part in persuading hundreds of his former
followers still hiding in the surrounding mountains to surrender to the new
authorities. In this way Zhong Zupei came to play a not inconsiderable role in
restoring peace to the Gongcheng area. Despite this happy resolution, orders
came soon after from the Guangxi People’s Committee that Zhong Zupei be
taken to Guilin under escort for punishment. Guarantees of safety
notwithstanding, on February 27, 1951 he was publicly shot, along with his
secretary. In subsequent years, particularly during the years of the Cultural
Revolution, not only members of Zhong Zupei’s family but many other people
in Gongcheng with any connection to Zhong lived in constant fear for their
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lives.36)
Almost half a century later, in the year 2000, Huang Jishu paid a visit to the
home of the same security chief who had guaranteed Zhong Zupei’s life in
return for his surrender. Though a very old man, he recalled the episode
clearly, speaking of it in bitter tones : “The arrangement was that his life and
safety would be spared－ how could I go back on such a promise ! But severe
methods are required to keep control in times of upheaval, so no doubt those
in authority at the time felt that they had to consider the larger picture, not
just the situation on the ground. . .”37)
Individual life-stories like these are conspicuous by their absence from the
traditional bandit-suppression accounts. How was Huang Jishu able to hunt
down such stories and include them in his account of the Guangxi suppression
campaigns? In a number of private communications to the authors, he told us
something about his life and about how he came to write his book.
From 1962 to 1968 I served with [the PLA’s] Guangxi Military District,
first as a soldier and later in the District Office, working in the District
Headquarters and later in the political section. My first encounter with the
history of bandit suppression in Guangxi came at this time, when I
encountered officers and men who had served in the campaigns. . . . After
visiting several places deep in the mountains of Yaoshan [once a major site
of resistance to the CPC regime] searching for materials on the suppression
campaigns, I first conceived the idea of putting together a comprehensive
history of the bandit suppression campaigns that followed the establishment
of the new government. For various reasons, however, I was unable to put
my plan into action.
In 1980, by which time I had become a part-time writer, I took part in a
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creative writing study group organized by the Guangxi chapter of the
Writers’ Guild (作家協会), and the experience rekindled my idea of writing
about the post-Liberation suppression campaigns. That autumn, with the
approval of the Guild, I plunged into the mountains of the Dayaoshan armed
with no more than a small knapsack. In the course of a month spent
climbing mountains and fording rivers, I had collected a large amount of
first-hand material on the suppression campaigns in that part of Guangxi.
After my return, unfortunately, I was so busy with the writing of my two
historical novels, ‘The First President’ (第一個総統) and ‘Annals of the
Guangxi Clique’ (桂系演義),38) that I once again had no time to think about
bandit suppression.
In the early 1990s I was elected a member of the Guangxi Zhuang Self-
Governing Area’s Zhengxie, and also found myself on that body’s Historical
Archives committee helping to put out its journal Wenshi chunqiu (文史春
秋). . . During this time I came across many more materials on the
suppression campaign, including some reports which showed clearly how
the former Guomindang government had been paying bandits to cause
trouble. In 	I came to be aware of a number of vivid memoirs
written by former gang leaders among the “political bandits” who, as a
result of the pacification campaigns, had surrendered and been granted
amnesty (招安), later coming to work for the Zhengxie. Wei Ruilin, for
example, had served under the prominent bandit chief Li Meimei (李妹妹)
prior to the latter’s pacification and had later come to be vice-chairman of
the Guangxi Zhengxie, while Feng Huang, former commander of the
Guomindang’s “Anti-Communist 19th National Salvation Army”, had been
appointed a permanent committee member. On the basis of these materials
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I was able to track these men down and they proved to be a precious source
of information. Once again I began to feel a strong need to actually get down
to writing my own account of the suppression campaigns.
In May 1994, with the encouragement of the Guangxi Historical Archives
Committee, Wenshi chunqiu, and the Qinzhou (州) City Zhengxie, I
travelled to Guitai Township (台) in the hinterland of what had
historically been one of old Guangxi’s greatest bandit lairs, the Shiwan
dashan (十万大山), to visit the birthplace of Wei Xiuying (秀英),
one-time Commander of the “Guangdong-Guangxi Border Region
Anti-Communist National Salvation Army” (粤桂区反共救国軍) and
Guangxi’s most famous female bandit chief. With the help of an informal
discussion meeting I called, I was able to inquire after people who might
have knowledge of the events of those years, inspect some of the
battlegrounds, and also acquire a lot more first-hand materials. . . . In the
course of my visits to most of the best-known bandit strongholds of
pre-Liberation Guangxi, I even began to feel as if some of the “bandit spirit”
(匪気) had rubbed off on me!39)
Huang Jishu’s book focuses on the “small picture”, where unknown people
become unsung heroes, rather than the “big picture” which calls among other
things for the execution of men like Zhong Zupei. Following the suppression
of the “great bandit revolt” of spring 1950 in Guangxi, many of the “bandit”
chiefs were killed, while many others surrendered and made various kinds of
contribution to the new People’s Government only, in most cases, to find
themselves in front of a firing squad. However much history seeks to obscure
these unpleasant episodes, it is impossible to eliminate all those who know
about them. Through his repeated fact-finding visits to the mountains of
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Guangxi, Huang Jishu successfully opened up new lines of communication with
these “people in the know”, making it possible for him to write the kind of
book that he wrote.
He had some surprises, too. As already noted, many of those who had
succeeded in slipping through the bandit-suppression net had made their way
to Taiwan, others to Hong Kong or Macau or even over the border into
Vietnam. Following the loosening of social controls in China after the
commencement of “Reform & Opening”, particularly after the warming of
cross-Strait relations, those among them who were still alive began returning
home one by one to seek out their families.40) These “overseas visitors”
proved to be yet another source of intimate and little-known detail on the
situation in post-1949 Guangxi that cannot be found anywhere outside the
writings of Huang Jishu.41)
Huang’s research also threw new light on some of the indirect effects of
Guangxi’s violent “bandit suppression” years. The majority of men who
emerged as “bandit chiefs” during those years were leaders of the “village
gentry”. While some may have been examples of the “local bullies” depicted
in communist propaganda, most were highly respected men in their locality
who, as well as being responsible for governing local affairs, were well-versed
in the traditional Confucian canon and, whether by opening schools or by
merely living a life beyond reproach, took seriously their role as purveyors of
basic morality for local inhabitants. When men like Zhong Zupei took it upon
themselves, in the name of “National Salvation”, to defend the values they
espoused from the armed inroads of a new regime that promised to turn their
world upside down, who among them could have imagined that, at one swing
of the political pendulum, they would be hunted down and shot as “bandit
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chiefs”, the reverse of all they had stood for? By eliminating this class of
village-level educator-managers, the side-effect of the CPC’s “bandit
suppression” campaign was to thrust rural Guangxi, formerly among the top
five producers of “No. 1 scholars” (状元) under the old examination system,
into a cultural Dark Age from which it has barely begun to recover.42)
It is this kind of information that makes Huang Jishu’s book unlike any other
account of bandit suppression in Guangxi (or anywhere else). Because he is
a writer not an academic, he is not bound by the customary rules of historical
scholarship. Since his book is a work of reportage, we find no precise record
of the dates of his fact-finding visits, the places he visited or the people he
interviewed, only the information that Huang chose to impart in the pages of
his book. As a historical document, therefore, at least from an academic point
of view, the book has some shortcomings. On the other hand, it is a vivid
record of some of the tragic and complex events that accompanied the advent
of communist power in one province of China.
NOTES
1) This essay first appeared in Chinese in the review column of the Shanghai
morning paper Oriental Morning Post (東方早報 ; August 7, 2011, page 6). See
Xu Youwei 2011. For this English version, the original text has been expanded
and amended.
For an overall treatment of bandits in China, see Billingsley 1988.
2) Filmed in monochrome, the movie was a smash hit in its time but had little
appeal to increasingly sophisticated young people growing up under the Reform
& Opening regime of the 1990s. In 2007, the story was reissued in the form of
a 23-episode television drama with improved characterization, more visually-
attractive sets, and, of course, using colour photography. Clearly, the
government has not forgotten the propaganda appeal of bandit-suppression
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adventures.
3) The opera was later made into a popular movie said to have been the most-
watched movie of all time.
4) Qu Bo 1957. The book was translated into English by Sydney Shapiro and
published in 1978 by Foreign Languages Press under the title Tracks in the
Snowy Forest.
5) The first of these to appear was Deng Lifeng 1996.
6) Another problem with most of these volumes was that they gave no sources
for the facts they claimed. This was partly because it would have been
“inconvenient” to list the names of military units and so on, partly because, in
Chinese scholarship of the time, it was not deemed necessary for scholars to
back up their claims with documentation. In combination with the lurid (and not
always appropriate) covers evidently considered by publishers to increase a
book’s selling power, the effect was to make these suppression accounts
(including Deng Lifeng’s work cited above) appear less than reliable from a
scholarly point of view. In point of fact, most of them were indeed based on
documentation that, if one-sided, was at least authentic. (See Xu Youwei 2011
for details.)
7) See Xu Youwei and Philip Billingsley 2002.
8) 中国人民解放軍歴史資料叢書編審委員会主持 20012006.
9) Each volume, written by one or more respected local researchers, deals with
a separate military district, namely Northwest China, North China, East China,
Southwest China, Northeast China and Central-South China.
10) See the General Preface (出版説明), included in each volume, for a statement
of the series’ rationale.
11) See Asano 1993 : 11.
12) Outside China, scholarly accounts of this topic are few and far between. In
English, Brown 2007 considers the case of Guizhou province. For a Japanese
assessment, see Asano 1993.
13) Brown 2007 : 122.
14) Brown 2007 : 105.
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15) Huang Jishu 2011.
16) Deng Lifeng 1996, II : 630.
17) Preface to 『広西剿匪紀実』 (Record of bandit suppression in Guangxi), cited
in Huang Jishu 2011 : 281.
18) Li Tianyou 1978. Though completed in 1964, Li’s manuscript remained
unpublished during his lifetime (he died in 1970), and was finally published
posthumously.
19) Li Tianyou 1978 : 104.
20) See, respectively, 広西軍区政治部, 中共広西壮族自治区党史辧合 1991,
and 中共広西壮族自治区党史研究室 2008.
21) Huang Jishu 2011 : 2526.
22) ｢無処不有山､ 無山不有洞､ 無洞不有匪｣, quoted in 中共広西壮族自治区党
史研究室2008 : 14.
A similar situation had been created throughout much of China in the 1920s,
when discharged or defeated warlord soldiers fled to the nearest mountains with
their weapons and joined the regular bandits already ensconced there. For more
information on these “soldier-bandits” (兵匪), see Billingsley 1988 : chapter 8.
23) Brown’s research has shown that many of Guizhou’s suppressed “bandits”
were subsequently sent to serve on the Korean front. (It was the American
forces’ interrogation of those who were captured that provided Brown with his
primary data on the situation in Guizhou.)Whether the original intention was to
create cannon fodder for the battlefield is not clear, but it may be assumed that
the same fate befell many of the suppressed Guangxi “bandits”.
Interestingly enough, the traditional prejudice against bandits continued on the
battlefield. Brown cites a case in which former bandit units, scorned by other
soldiers as “redesignated bandit ragtag troops” (土匪改変過来的雑睥軍), were
given coarse grains to eat rather than rice. (Brown 2007 : 127)
24) 中央文献研究室編 19871998, I : 659, 666, cited in He Chengxue 1997 : 50
55, 61. See also Fan Dongfang 1996 : 2426. Taken together, these two articles
show clearly the seriousness with which Mao viewed the situation in Guangxi.
Deng Lifeng 1996 (II : 420436) also has a separate section on the effects of
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Mao’s intervention in the campaign. Reports of assassination plots by
Guomindang agents against Mao and other top CPC leaders may well have
fuelled Mao’s anxiety. See Asano 1993 : 5.
25) See Asano 1993 : 56, 21.
26) See also Ibid : 6.
27) 『新貴州日報』, cited in Brown 2007 : 126.
28) Huang Jishu 2011 : 1. However, figures on the total number of “bandits”
exterminated tend to differ from source to source.
29) Huang Jishu, private communications, 25 July, 2011 and March 14, 2012.
30) Ibid.
31) Zhengxie : short for Quanguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang hui (全国人民政治協
商会 ; Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). While the
organization’s political role is ostensibly that of an advisory body to the CPC
government, one of its many offshoots is the Committee for Cultural and
Historical Data (文史資料委員会), which maintains archives in each province to
collect and preserve materials on provincial and local affairs.
32) Huang Jishu, private communications, 25 July, 2011 and March 14, 2012.
33) Hua Tuo ((華佗); 145-c. 208) was a Han dynasty physician celebrated as the
first person to use anaesthesia to treat injuries.
34) Huang Jishu 2011 : 9597.
35) Huang Jishu, private communication, March 14, 2012.
36) Ibid.
37) Huang Jishu 2011 : 5470. Mao Zedong had explicitly called for state terror to
quieten the opposition. “Kill all who should be killed” (応殺者､ 均殺之), Mao
had written on one report he received of bandit-suppression work in early
February 1951, and he subsequently defended the killing of “bandit leaders and
habitual bandits” as necessary for the consolidation of power. (『建国以来毛沢
東文稿』 1988, 2 : 112, 124) Deng Xiaoping, in charge of security for southwest
China, also called for “resolutely” killing enemies without “appeasing and
hesitating”. (Brown 2007 : 123, 129)
Zhong Zupei’s daughter, feeling responsible for her father’s death, left China
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at the first opportunity and settled in the USA. Her resentment at the
communists for breaking their promise to spare Zhong Zupei’s life continued
until the day she died. (Huang Jishu, private communication, March 12, 2012.)
38) See, respectively, Huang Jishu, Zhao Yuanling, Su Lili 1984 and Huang Jishu
2007. While the latter volume provides more details on Zhong Zupei, it takes his
story only up to December 1949 and therefore does not deal with the 1950
“bandit revolt” in which Zhong played such a pivotal role.
39) Huang Jishu, private communication, 22 July, 2011.
40) Ibid, 25 July, 2011.
41) According to a recent communication received by the authors from Huang
Jishu, the appearance of his book appears to have opened the floodgates on the
topic of post-1949 “bandit suppression” in Guangxi. Gongcheng County, for
example, has established a special team to collect documents related to Zhong
Zupei’s rebellion and its aftermath, and plans to issue a collection of those
documents in the near future. Based on oral interviews with people in the know,
much of the information contained in those documents had still been under wraps
when Huang Jishu did his own research, and they evidently contain revelations
that shocked even Huang himself. Other Guangxi counties have also begun
compiling documents. (Huang Jishu, private communication, 15 September,
2012)
42) Ibid, March 12, 2012. From the CPC’s standpoint, needless to say, this side-
effect was highly desirable.
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“Listen to What the Bandits Have to Say !”:
Voices from the Post-“Liberation”
Suppression Campaign in Guangxi
XU Youwei
Philip BILLINGSLEY
One of the principal claims to legitimacy of the post-1949 Communist Party
of China (CPC) regime was its elimination of the country’s bandit gangs.
More than three years passed before the CPC achieved unchallenged control
over China, largely because of the continuing nuisance posed by “bandits”,
many of whom were being instigated by agents of the Nationalist government
on Taiwan. “Bandit suppression” campaigns became a constant feature of the
new regime’s early years, but the truth about these campaigns was swept
under the carpet for more than 40 years.
Since the mid-1990s, numerous volumes of reportage describing the post-
1949 bandit suppression campaigns have appeared. While they provided
details of the number of gangs suppressed, these reports gave no voice to the
“bandits” themselves. We learn much about the regime’s anxieties, but no
understanding of the “bandits’” reasons for existence.
A new book has now appeared that throws a very different light on the post-
1949 campaigns. Huang Jishu’s ‘Defeated Soldiers become Bandits: a History
of the 19491952 Suppression Campaign’ (敗兵成匪 : 1949到1952年的剿匪
往事), about the “bandit suppression” campaign in Guangxi province, is based
largely on interviews with former “bandits” or with their surviving family
members. As well as describing the military campaigns, the book also tells the
story through the eyes of the campaigns’ targets. This essay seeks to give a
more accurate picture of the post-1949 situation in one part of China by
focusing on Huang Jishu’s book.
